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LECTURE
RACE RELATIONS LAW IN THE CANON OF
LEGAL ACADEMIA
Randall Kenned'
Should a course on race relations law be part of the curricular
canon of a law school? If so, what should such a course offer? If such
a course is offered, with what political and pedagogical attitude should
it be taught? These are the primary questions addressed in this Essay.
I.
Law schools should equip students with knowledge and techniques
that the legal academy is well positioned to explore and impart and
that will be of benefit to society. From this premise it follows that a
law school should offer a course that investigates the ways in which
race relations have affected and have been affected by legal
institutions, particularly the judiciary. After all, racial conflicts and
efforts to regulate them have played a large and ongoing part in the
development of American common law, statutory law, and
constitutional law. On one level, this is an obvious point. Anyone
with an appreciable knowledge of the United States knows that race
matters and has long mattered to Americans. On another level, even
well-educated people are often unaware of the pervasiveness of the
influence of racial conflict upon Americans' preferences, habits,
conduct, and institutions. Many are aware at some vague, abstract
level that racial "slavery" and "segregation" and other forms of
"oppression" have mocked the high-minded ideals voiced in the
foundational documents of the United States. Relatively few,
however, receive instruction in secondary schooling or college that
enables them to have a vivid and detailed understanding of these evils
and of their ramifications.
Law schools should also allocate substantial resources to the study
of race relations law because of the peculiarly influential role of
* This Essay is a revised version of a lecture given as part of the Robert L
Levine Distinguished Lecture Series presented at Fordham Law School on October 5,
1999. A version of this essay will appear in an upcoming book. Randall Kennedy,
Race Relations Law in the Canon of Legal Academia, in Legal Canons (Balkin &
Levinson eds., forthcoming 2000).
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attorneys in the United States. Attorneys constitute a significant
group even when they stay within a narrow professional niche; after
all, one of the three branches of federal power, the judiciary, is
virtually an exclusive preserve of attorneys. The influence of
attorneys as a group, however, extends far beyond the judiciary
insofar as many lawyers pursue careers in legislatures, administration,
journalism, and business. Given the depth, complexity, and
pervasiveness of racial controversies in the United States, an attorney
who is ignorant of "The American Dilemma" is an attorney with a
deficient education. Given the influence of lawyers, the prospect that
an appreciable number of them might be undereducated about a
matter that is so vital to American democracy is a cause for concern
and an impetus to support the study of race relations law.
Wherever one turns in the legal universe, one encounters disputes
that have often reached their most intense pitch in the crucible of
struggles over "the race question." Americans have come to blows
with one another over a variety of divisions-for example, class
conflict, gender distinctions, ideological splits, and religious
differences. It was disagreement over the fate of racial slavery,
however, that erupted into civil war. The effort to re-create a
shattered union in the aftermath of that war led to three amendments
to the United States Constitution-the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments-that fundamentally changed the relation of
the individual to state and federal governments and the relation of the
states to the central government. A very large portion of
constitutional law today stems from this transformation. This includes
not only judicial, legislative, and executive actions that are explicitly
racial in nature, but also most of the actions taken by states that are
alleged to violate the federally guaranteed rights of individuals.' A
course on race relations and the law should be a central curricular
offering at every law school because every lawyer should know, as
part of his or her mastery of the key elements of American legal
institutions, that the struggle against racial injustice has been the great
seedbed for advances in civil liberties and civil rights for all persons.
Responses to racial abuses of power have led to the creation of
much of the law that protects due process and freedom of expression.2
Such responses have also led to important achievements in other
areas. Citizenship, for example, is a fundamental legal status. It
distinguishes members of a polity from those who are non-members.
1. See Clement Eaton, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the Old South 118-
43 (rev. & enlarged ed., Harper & Row 1964) (1940); Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime,
and the Law 29-135 (1997).
2. See Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights 25-26 (1986); Eric Foner, The Story of American
Freedom 163-93 (1998); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First Amendment 65-
121 (1965); William Lee Miller, Arguing About Slavery: The Great Battle in the
United States Congress 491-514 (1996).
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It thus implicates what Michael Walzer describes as the most
important questions in adjudicating matters of distributive justice:
Who constitutes the relevant community and how is that community
constituted?3
The Constitution of 1787 neglected to define national citizenship.
In the infamous case of Dred Scott v. Sandford,4 however, the
Supreme Court decided that whatever the full meaning of national
citizenship, it meant at least the exclusion of African Americans. 5
Blacks, the Court ruled, whether enslaved or free, could never
become citizens of the United States.6 To change that radical act of
rejection required a constitutional amendment. The Fourteenth
Amendment declares that "[a]ll persons born ... in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States."7 Birth-right citizenship is a distinctive feature of American
political culture. Without a knowledge of race relations and its effect
on legal developments, one cannot understand satisfactorily the roots
of this definition of American citizenship and the reason proposals
that even consider changing it generate high anxiety, if not outright
condemnation.8
Being born in the United States is not the only way to become a
citizen; one can also attain citizenship through naturalization. The
history of naturalization is another story significantly shaped by racial
conflict. From 1790 until 1952, federal law stipulated that, with
certain exceptions, a person had to be "white" in order to be eligible
for naturalization. 9  The enforcement of this law created a
jurisprudence of racial classification that deemed people of certain
nationalities or ethnicities to be "white"-and therefore eligible for
3. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality
31-35 (1983).
4. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
5. See id at 406-07.
6. See id
7. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. See Peter H. Schuck & Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal
Aliens in the American Polity 2-3, 63-83 (1985); see also Gerald L Neuman, Back to
Dred Scott?, 24 San Diego L. Rev. 485, 485-86 (1987) (reviewing Peter H. Schuck &
Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity
(1985)).
9. In 1870, for example, Congress made persons born in Africa and persons of
African descent eligible for naturalization. See Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policies:
Messages of Exclusion to African Americans, 37 How. L.J. 237,245 & n.40 (1994). As
anticipated, however, in the nineteenth century, relatively few people in these
categories immigrated to the United States and became naturalized citizens. In the
twentieth century, the numbers have grown but are still strikingly small in comparison
with peoples from other areas of the world. See id. at 240; see also Charles Gordon,
The Racial Barrier to American Citizenship, 93 U. Pa. L Rev. 237, 238-41 (1945)
(examining the origin and development of racial restrictions on naturalization).
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citizenship-and people of other nationalities or ethnicities to be
"nonwhite"-and therefore doomed to permanent status as aliens."0
Many people take for granted the demographics of the United
States, as if the character of the population was merely an accident of
history. A properly constructed course on race relations law would
teach students that, to a substantial extent, racial considerations have
shaped immigration policies."1 For example, absent the anti-Chinese
animus that led to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 188212 and the anti-
Japanese prejudice that led to the Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924,'1
there would be a considerably larger presence of Asian Americans in
the United States today.14 Many people also take for granted the
geography of the United States, as if that, too, simply emerged as a
fact of nature. A good course on race relations law, however, would
show that racial conflict significantly shaped the negotiations,
transactions, and conquests pursuant to which the United States,
dominated by "white" people, wrested a continent away from various
peoples who were perceived as colored: the "red" Indians and the
"brown" Mexicans.' 5
Many people take for granted their racial identity and that of their
friends, kin, lovers, and neighbors. A comprehensive course on race
relations law would show, however, that in substantial numbers of
cases, the question "Who is 'white'?" or "Who is 'colored'?" has
generated sharp conflict, giving rise to some of the most poignant
disputes in all of American law. 6 Consider, for example, Green v.
10. See Ian F. Haney L6pez, White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race 116-
33 (1996).
11. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolttion Comes to Immigration Law:
A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,75 N.C. L. Rev. 273,275-
76 (1996).
12. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882),
repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600.
13. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, repealed by Immigration and
Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952, ch. 477, tit. IV, § 403(a)(23), 66 Stat. 163,
279.
14. See Bill Ong Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America Through
Immigration Policy 1850-1990, at 43-49 (1993).
15. See Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American
Racial Anglo-Saxonism 189-90, 231 (1981).
16. See, e.g., F. James Davis, Who is Black? One Nation's Definition 1-16 (1991)
(describing who is considered black historically in the United States); Virginia R.
Dominguez, White By Definition: Social Classification in Creole Louisiana 23-55
(1986) (discussing the history of racial classifications); Charles S. Mangum, Jr., The
Legal Status of the Negro 1-17 (1940) (surveying contemporary state laws defining
who is a Negro); Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law 12-
25 (Negro Univs. Press 1969) (1910) (analyzing the question of "What is a Negro?");
Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-
Conscious Law, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1231-32, 1262-79 (1994) (exploring laws and
regulations that classify by race or other grouping); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating
Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 Yale
L.J. 109, 123-56 (1998) (discussing uses of racial knowledge, "evidence and essences,"
physical attributes, ancestry and reputation to determine race); Christine B. Hickman,
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City of New Orleans7 which arose from the following heartrending
facts. A white woman gave birth to a baby. Soon afterwards, the
woman died. The woman's sister took the baby to her home and
planned to raise the child. As time went on, however, the baby's skin
began to darken, which led to complaints from white neighbors." The
baby's aunt soon capitulated, returning the child, a little girl, to city
authorities. These authorities placed the child with black foster
parents who, falling in love with her, sought to adopt the child. The
authorities initially approved this effort but then resisted it when an
examination of the child's birth certificate disclosed that she was
registered as "white" by the state Bureau of Vital Statistics. 9 A
Louisiana law prohibited adoption across racial lines. The foster
parents sought to change the racial designation on the child's birth
certificate from "white" to "colored. ' 2  But this effort, too, was
thwarted. Considering that the mother was white, that the identity of
the father was unknown, that experts in racial classification disagreed,
that the child's racial character was ambiguous, and that initial official
declarations of racial identity were entitled to a strong presumption of
validity, the authorities refused to change the child's racial
designation. The Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling,
stating a change in racial designation should occur only when the
relevant evidence "leaves no room for doubt"2' because the
registration of a racial birthright "must be given as much sanctity in
the law as the registration of a property right."2' This ruling left the
child in limbo. As a white child, she could not be adopted by the
black foster parents who had grown to love her. As a person of color,
she stood no chance of being accepted socially by whites in
segregationist Louisiana, regardless of what her birth certificate
The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, and the U.S.
Census, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1161, 1164-66 (1997) (discussing the rise of a biracial
population in the United States and its effect on traditional racial classifications);
Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of "Race" in
Twentieth-Century America, 83 J. Am. Hist. 44, 48-67 (1996) (discussing what
constitutes race in the context of anti-miscegenation laws); John C. Calhoun, Note,
Who is a Negro?, 11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 235, 235-40 (1958) (reviewing elaborate
definitions in anti-miscegenation statutes and recommending standardization) Chris
Ballentine, Note, "Who is a Negro?" Revisited: Determining Individual Racial Status
for Purposes of Affirmative Action, 35 U. Fla. L. Rev. 683, 685-90 (1983) (examining
racial criteria for affirmative action programs).
17. 88 So. 2d 76 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
18. See iL at 77.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Id at 80 (quoting Treadaway v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 56 So. 2d 249,
250 (La. Ct. App. 1952)).
22. Id. at 81 (quoting Treadaway v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health. 61 So. 2d 735,
739 (La. 1952)).
2000] 1989
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
stated. Few cases illustrate more vividly the cruel lunacy of American
pigmentocracy. 23
Granted the significance of the race question in American legal
culture, why explore it in a specialized course? Might such a course
be relegated to an academic ghetto by professors and students who
perceive it as a sop to "political correctness?" Why not explore the
subject throughout the law school curriculum?
Exploring the racial dimensions of a subject ought to be done
wherever pursuing such a tack would be enlightening given the aims at
hand. For example, if one seeks, in a course on contracts, to
investigate the duty to speak, misrepresentation, caveat emptor, and
related concepts, one might well do so in the context of cases in which
men have sought to escape matrimonial obligations on the grounds
that wives or fianc6es had concealed or failed to disclose their racial
ancestries. 4  A teacher of property concerned with exploring
arguments for and against various modes of governmental regulation
of housing markets, should certainly consider using, as heuristic
vehicles, the laws that prohibit racial discrimination in housing
transactions.25 A teacher of civil procedure can do no better than
Walker v. City of Birmingham 6 -a case arising from racial conflict on
a grand scale-in terms of introducing students to the collateral bar
rule.27 A teacher of torts, interested in generating lively and
instructive class discussion on the intentional infliction of emotional
23. See generally Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a
New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 Yale L.J. 1, 24 (1998) (discussing and
defining "pigmentocracy").
24. See, e.g., In re Monks' Estate, 120 P.2d 167, 169 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941)
(contesting a will on the grounds that the decedent's marriage violated anti-
miscegenation laws); Theophanis v. Theophanis, 51 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Ky. 1932)
(analyzing a husband's allegation that he was never married to his wife because she
was a mulatto); Sunseri v. Cassagne, 185 So. 1, 4-5 (La. 1938) (analyzing a husband's
suit to annul his marriage because his wife was a member of the negro race); Van
Houten v. Morse, 38 N.E. 705, 705 (Mass. 1894) (discussing the defense of breach of
promise to marry based on plaintiff's alleged concealment of "some negro blood in
her veins"): Ferrall v. Ferrall, 69 S.E. 60, 62-63 (N.C. 1910) (Clark, J., concurring)
(denying a husband his request to annul his marriage because of his wife's alleged
African American ancestry).
25. For a first-year casebook on property law that spends a considerable amount
of space exploring issues involving racial conflict, see Joseph William Singer, Property
Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices (2d ed. 1997). See also Race, Poverty, and
American Cities (John Charles Boger & Judith Welch Wegner eds., 1996) at ix-xi
(suggesting that problems of urban unrest are rooted in poverty and race); Clement E.
Vose, Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive
Covenant Cases (1959) passim (discussing racism with respect to property and
restrictive covenants).
26. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
27. See generally Alan F. Westin & Berry Mahoney, The Trial of Martin Luther
King (1974) (telling the story of King's arrest in Birmingham for defying a court order
not to parade without a permit).
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distress, should consider including in the syllabus one or more of the
many cases in which the word "nigger" has prompted a lawsuit?
There are many other contexts in which, outside of a course
specifically devoted to race relations, the race question can be usefully
explored. In a course on jurisprudence, one may consider including in
the syllabus cases, speeches, and other materials generated in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by American combatants for or
against slavery-for example Nat Turner, David Walker, John Brown,
John C. Calhoun, William Lloyd Garrison, and Jefferson Davis-to
probe the conditions under which people are obligated to obey the
law or justified in taking up arms against the state. In teaching a
course on professional responsibility, an instructor might want to ask
whether an attorney's Jewishness ought to figure into her decision to
accept or decline as a client a bank accused of hiding Nazi war loot or
whether an attorney's "blackness" ought to figure into his decision to
accept or decline as a client a firm charged with illegal racial
discrimination in hirings or promotions.29
Hence, without any sort of overreaching, there exist many
opportunities for professors teaching basic subjects to highlight the
racial aspects or consequences of a given problem or doctrine.
Teachers should seize upon these occasions when it furthers the
academic mission of the project at hand. It is unlikely, however, that
professors teaching a course on contracts, torts, civil procedure, and so
on, will have time to assess comprehensively the distinctly racial
aspect of their subject, for example the development of various racial
ideologies within the American judiciary. After all, the primary aim
of a course on contracts or torts or civil procedure is to develop a
mastery of those subjects. Although studying racial conflict may
illuminate an area of those subjects, they encompass far more territory
than even the large area of racial conflict. To study as a primary focus
of inquiry the relationship between race relations and the law, a
28. See Johnson v. Fambrough, 706 So. 2d 739, 741 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); Alcorn
v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 217 (Cal. 1970): Motley v. Flowers & Versagi
Court Reporters, No. 72069, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 5542, at *3 (Ct. App. Dec. 11,
1997); see also Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133, 133 (1982) (citing racial
epithet cases); Marjorie Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words That
Wound," 18 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 585, 585 (1983) (responding to Professor
Delgado's article); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Hin Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431, 449-57 (analyzing the debate over how
to handle the increasing number of racist speech incidents on college campuses);
Richard D. Bernstein, Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words
Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1749. 1752 n.17
(1985) (citing racial epithet cases).
29. See Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the
Construction of Professional Identity, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1577, 1602 (1993); David B.
Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment. Should a Black Lawyer Represent the
Ku Klux Klan?, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1030, 1033 (1995).
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school needs a stand-alone course, a course in which the race question
itself can be at the center of attention.
II.
The canon of race relations law in the United States should consist
of materials that convey an understanding of the ideas, events,
movements, and personalities that are essential for an appreciation of
the large influence of race relations upon American legal culture.
This field is too massive to cover comprehensively in any one
casebook, monograph, or course. Hence, the need exists in this field,
as in many others, for difficult choices governing the allocation of
time, energy, and attention. For teachers facing the difficult task of
selecting what to include, and thus what to exclude, I offer the
following suggestions.
The first stems from questions posed by J.M. Balkin and Sanford
Levinson. In Canons of Constitutional Law, after describing Chief
Justice Roger Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford and Frederick
Douglass's speech Address at Glasgow: The Constitution of the United
States: Is it Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery?, they ask:
Should either of these two texts, or both, or neither, appear in
contemporary constitutional law casebooks? Which should
American law students study and discuss, which should educated
citizens know about, and which should inform the work of legal
academics in the present era? Which of these writings, in short,
should form part of the "canon" of American legal materials? 3°
I agree with their conclusion that Douglass's speech warrants
inclusion. I use it and have found that it adds considerable vitality to
class discussions regarding slavery, anti-slavery, and the secession
crisis, and in my view teachers should import into their monographs,
casebooks, syllabi, lectures, and classes anything that makes the
subject in question more vivid, accessible, and meaningful to their
audiences. Frederick Douglass's biography and the vigor of his
speech and writings make works by him an especially attractive
prospect for study and discussion. Indeed, students are missing
something very important if they do not have direct access to the
voices and rhetorics of Douglass, Sojourner Truth, Solomon
Northrup, William Wells Brown, Harriet F. Jacobs, and other black
abolitionists who skillfully transmuted their experience as former
slaves, runaway slaves, or semi-free ante-bellum Negroes into a
distinctive critique of "The Slave Power". The same is true of the
voices and rhetorics of Fannie Lou Hamer, Bayard Rustin, Malcolm
X, Martin Luther King, Jr., and other champions of the Second
Reconstruction. Even in a law school course focused rather narrowly
30. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canon of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 963, 967-68 (1998) (footnote omitted).
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on legal doctrine, something important is missing if students are
unaware of the substance of King's "I Have a Dream" speech or his
"Letter From A Birmingham Jail."
Levinson and Balkin, however, do not answer the question of
priority. As between Taney's infamous opinion and Douglass's
stirring speech, they do not say which text a teacher should choose to
study more or choose to study at all if scarcities of time, space, or
attention preclude the possibility of studying both. A suitable answer
depends upon the aims of the teacher. I can imagine a wonderful
course on constitutional law that gives priority to Taney's opinion, and
I can also imagine a wonderful course that gives priority to Douglass's
speech. I would be likely to give priority to Taney's opinion on two
grounds. The first has to do with the academic division of labor. My
marginal intellectual advantage over colleagues in other parts of the
university stems from my specialized training in the understanding
and manipulation of judicial texts. I can probably best allocate the
fruits of that advantage to law school students by focusing my energies
primarily on such texts while using other materials as supplementary
aids. The second reason has to do with my impression of the relative
social significance of various documents and my choice to focus the
attention of my students primarily on those things of greatest
consequence. Horrible though it was, Taney's opinion has exercised
more influence than Douglass's speech on the American
constitutional regime and is thus a more important document for law
students to know. Underlying this pedagogical judgment is my sense
that of the various types of canonicity, the cultural literacy canon is
the most appropriate for a teacher to embrace. According to Balkin
and Levinson, the cultural literacy canon is constituted by "the
materials that any educated person should know about in order to
participate in and contribute to serious general discussions about
American law. 3 1 For purposes of a serious analysis of the secession
crisis, Taney's opinion is even more crucial to know about than
Douglass's great speech.
The fact is, however, that a teacher is seldom, if ever, faced with the
stark choice of discussing one text to the total exclusion of another.
Usually teachers are in a position to discuss several texts at once,
though they give priority to some over others. To throw useful light
on classic legal texts, teachers should consider assigning stories,
poems, and novels. The two classic texts concerning the federal
constitutional propriety of de jure racial segregation are Plessy v.
Ferguson32 and Brown v. Board of Education:.3 ' Both are essential
texts in any good course on race relations law in the United States.
Neither, however, reflects vividly what segregation actually meant as a
31. Id at 977.
32. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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matter of day-to-day lived experience. A useful supplement that
performs this task admirably is Richard Wright's collection of short
stories, Uncle Tom's Children.4 Another type of text that should be
considered for inclusion is music. For example, one way of vividly
illustrating the change in black consciousness reflected and nourished
by the successful campaign of litigation against de jure segregation
would be to play in a classroom Louis Armstrong's despairing 1930s
rendition of What Did I Do to Be So Black and Blue and contrast it to
James Brown's exuberant 1960s rendition of Say It Loud, I'm Black
and I'm Proud.
My second suggestion is that law school teachers focus more
attention than they currently do on lawmaking institutions other than
the courts.35  One cannot, for example, obtain an adequate
understanding of the Reconstruction constitutional amendments and
civil rights legislation by viewing them solely through the lens of
Supreme Court decisions. Teachers of race relations law, and other
subjects as well, should revisit the debates held in Congress and state
legislatures to grasp the political and social circumstances that gave
rise to these enactments and affected their design. For example, in
evaluating provisions enacted, it helps to know about proposals
rejected. In considering the propriety of official racial distinctions in
light of the Fourteenth Amendment, it helps to know that the Thirty-
ninth Congress rejected a proposed Fourteenth Amendment that
would have expressly prohibited the making of racial distinctions.3
Similarly, to understand adequately the Fifteenth Amendment, it
helps to know that Congress rejected a version that would have
provided citizens with a right to vote and instead embraced a far more
limited provision which merely provides a right to be free of racial
exclusions from the franchise.37
Another source of lawmaking to which scholars of race relations
law ought to devote more attention is the Executive Branch. Balkin
and Levinson are right to decry the marginalization of Abraham
Lincoln in the legal academic canon. 38  Regrettable too is the
marginalization of Andrew Johnson, Lincoln's successor and a fierce
opponent of the nation's first federal civil rights act, and indeed, the
Fourteenth Amendment. Johnson's veto message of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 is a document particularly worthy of inclusion in the
34. Richard Wright, Uncle Tom's Children (Harper & Row 1965) (1940).
35. This, too, echoes a point made by Balkin and Levinson, supra note 30, at 1003-
04. A somewhat dated text that is attentive to the need to take into account, at the
state and federal levels, all lawmaking agencies, including organs of propaganda and
scholarship that regulate public opinion, is The Civil Rights Record: Black Americans
and the Law, 1849-1970, at viii (Richard Bardolph ed., 1970).
36. See Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution 67 (1992).
37. See William Gillette, The Right to Vote: Politics and the Passage of the
Fifteenth Amendment 46-78 (1969).
38. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 30, at 1016.
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canon of race relations law. Commenting upon the provision of the
Act, which attempted to bestow citizenship upon all native-born
Americans regardless of race or previous condition of servitude,
Johnson objected that such a policy "proposes a discrimination against
large numbers of intelligent, worthy, and patriotic foreigners, and in
favor of the negro."39 Commenting upon the provision of the Act
which mandated that states permit all persons to contract, sue, own
property, and give evidence on the same terms as whites, Johnson
objected that it sought to "establish, for the security of the colored
race safeguards which go infinitely beyond any that the General
Government has ever provided for the white race. In fact, the
distinction of race and color is, by the [Act], made to operate in favor
of the colored and against the white race."' These comments, so
strikingly resonant of contemporary struggles over affirmative action,
indicate that the current debate has a longer lineage than is often
supposed. Johnson's comments also suggest the alacrity with which
some representatives of the white majority charge that measures
seeking racial equality for long-oppressed racial minorities are instead
illegitimate ventures into racial favoritism.
Third, I suggest that constructors of the canon of race relations law
focus more attention than heretofore upon certain significant silences
in the law. In addition to teaching, or at least alerting students to the
presence of, the huge amount of constitutional, statutory, and
administrative law that regulates race relations, a good course on the
subject should also note and explore important lacunae. Silence can
be as important as noise in law, as in life. The virtual absence of
"noise"-law-regarding the rape of enslaved black women, for
example, speaks volumes about the brutal reality of slavery; it signals
that, for the most part, legal regimes left slave women unprotected
against sexual violence. Similarly, the absence of a federal anti-
lynching law speaks volumes about the tenor of race relations
between the 1890s and the 1920s, a period during which hundreds of
blacks were lynched annually under the tolerant gaze of a largely
indifferent public. These silences need to be recognized and explored.
Another type of silence that warrants more attention is that which
stems from the apparent desire of decisionmakers to ignore the racial
element of a controversy even when that element is, in fact, a major
presence in the controversy. Two examples of this phenomenon are
Bailey v. Alabama4 and Frank v. Mangum.4 - Bailey brought into
question the validity of a state law that criminalized breaching a labor
contract when the employee failed to repay an advance on wages.
39. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1857, 1858 (1866) (message from
President Andrew Johnson).
40. Id. at 1859.
41. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
42. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
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Racial sentiments played a key role in the enactment and
administration of this statute-its purpose and effect was to intimidate
black labor. In striking down the statute, however, the Court went out
of its way to avoid mentioning the racial aspect of the case.43
Similarly, racial sentiments played a key role in the miscarriage of
justice that led to the rape conviction and later, the lynching of Leo
Frank." Accused of sexually abusing and murdering a white Christian
teenager in the pencil factory he managed, Frank's Jewishness
provoked a massive outpouring of anti-semitic fear, resentment, and
hatred that transformed his "trial" into a spectacle. The prosecution
of Leo Frank marked a high-point in the expression of anti-Jewish
prejudice in America. Yet, in reading the Supreme Court decision
that denied habeas corpus relief to Frank4-a major landmark in the
history of the great writ-one would never know that anti-semitism
had anything to do with the defendant's predicament. Silence of this
sort and the reasons for it warrant notice and greater study in
investigations of race relations law.
A fourth suggestion is that teachers of race relations law revisit
subjects that were once significant but that are now largely unknown.
An example is the caselaw that arose from the enforcement of anti-
miscegenation statutes.46 Over the course of three hundred years,
some forty-one colonies, territories, or states prohibited marriage
across racial lines. This generated an extraordinary array of
fascinating cases in which judges had to answer questions such as: For
purposes of deciding whether a couple was lawfully married, how
should a judge determine whether a man or woman was "black" or
"white?" In a jurisdiction prohibiting interracial marriage, should a
judge enforce a will in which a white man bequeathed all of his
property by deed of gift to his black mistress? What should happen if
an interracial couple married in a state that permitted their union and
then moved to a state that prohibited miscegenation?
The law created by these questions has largely disappeared from
legal academic consciousness, though some of this law is being
reconsidered because of its relevance to heated struggles today over
same-sex marriage.47 Virtually all that remains is the aptly titled case,
43. See Alexander N. Bickel & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., 9 History of the Supreme
Court of the United States: The Judiciary and Responsible Government 1910-21, at
820-24 (1984).
44. See generally Leonard Dinnerstein, The Leo Frank Case (1968) (reviewing
background to the case).
45. See Frank, 237 U.S. at 345.
46. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage
and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. Pub. L. 201, 204 (1998) (criticizing the analogy
of anti-miscegenation laws to statutes proscribing same-sex marriages); Andrew
Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 Tex. L. Rev.
921, 962-75 (1998) (examining the public policy implications in the refusal to
recognize same-sex marriages under the Defense of Marriage Act).
1996 [Vol. 68
RACE RELATIONS LA W
Loving v. Virginia,' in which the federal Supreme Court belatedly
invalidated anti-miscegenation laws.49 It is possible that a scholar who
is familiar with the caselaw generated by enforcement of the anti-
miscegenation laws would choose to forgo any investigation of this
area insofar as it no longer gives rise to live legal disputes and insofar
as there are other subjects that are, on balance, more worthwhile to
study. It is also likely, however, that for many scholars,
inattentiveness to prohibitions on interracial marriage reflects not a
conscious decision respecting pedagogical priorities but mere
ignorance; many scholars, particularly those born during or after the
Civil Rights Revolution, are simply unaware of the human misery
caused by anti-miscegenation statutes. Those who become aware of
this facet of race relations law may decide that, given scarcities of time
and energy, they are better off focusing attention on other matters.
An informed decision, however, cannot be made without knowledge
of this "lost" subject. Moreover, after gaining familiarity with it, some
scholars may find that the anti-miscegenation caselaw is surprisingly
relevant to contemporary concerns and therefore worthy of attention,
even at the cost of spending less time on other matters.
Kindred to the problem of the lost subject is the problem of the lost
case. Even within well-known, deeply-researched subjects, such as
voting rights, there exist neglected cases which scholars ought to make
more prominent. At the top of the list of such cases is Giles v.
Harris,5 a federal Supreme Court decision that should be essential
reading in the canon of race relations law."' In Giles, in an opinion by
48. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
49. See id. at 12. Mention of Loving offers an opportunity to combat the tendency
to focus excessively on the federal Supreme Court in derogation of state supreme
courts and other lawmaking bodies. The Supreme Court confronted anti-
miscegenation laws in 1967 near the end of the Civil Rights Revolution only after
scores of state legislatures had repealed their prohibitions against interracial
marriage. Nineteen years before Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion for the federal
Supreme Court in Loving, Judge Roger Traynor authored an opinion for the
Supreme Court of California that invalidated on federal constitutional grounds that
state's anti-miscegenation law. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17.46 (Cal. 1948).
50. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
51. I am not claiming to have discovered or rediscovered Giles. For valuable
discussions of the historiography of the case, see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-
Democracy, and the Canon (forthcoming 2000) (constitutional commentary). See also
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Race Racism and American Law 94,516 (1973) (discussing Giles);
Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 43, at 924-27 (same): Owen M. Fiss, 8 History of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1883-
1910, at 372-79, 384, 391 (1993) (same). I am merely noting that the case lacks the
salience that it should have and urging that arbiters of the race relations law canon
redress this neglect.
A contributing reason, perhaps, for Giles's obscurity is that the United States
Supreme Court has dropped it from its own historical memory. In South Carolina r.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), the Court presents a short history of efforts to evade
or nullify the Fifteenth Amendment on its way to justifying as policy and upholding as
a matter of constitutional law challenged provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the Court assumed that the State
of Alabama had embarked on a racial policy to exclude blacks from
the ballot box in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Nonetheless,
the Court declined to grant equitable relief to the plaintiffs.
According to Justice Holmes, the complaint in Giles:
imports that the great mass of the white population intends to keep
the blacks from voting. To meet such an intent something more
than ordering the plaintiff's name to be inscribed upon the [lists of
eligible voters] will be needed. If the conspiracy and the intent exist,
a name on a piece of paper will not defeat them. Unless we are
prepared to supervise the voting in that State by officers of the
court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff could get from equity
would be an empty form. Apart from damages to the individual,
relief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people
of a State and the State itself, must be given by them or by the
legislative and political department of the government of the United
States.52
Written at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Giles decision
sounded themes that resonate loudly at the opening of the twentieth-
first century in ongoing struggles over race relations, federalism, and
judicial power. Yet, as Professor Richard H. Pildes writes, "Giles has
been airbrushed out of the constitutional canon."53 As one of the
most notable Supreme Court decisions in American constitutional
history, a ruling fully as regrettable as Plessy v. Ferguson5 or
Korematsu v. United States,55 the consequential egregiousness of Giles
should be much better known than it is.
My fifth suggestion regarding the canon of race relations law
scholarship stems from a basic question concerning the contours of
the field: What should be the racial coverage of race relations law?
As things currently stand, the black-white racial frontier continues to
dominate the field for a variety of reasons. White-black racial conflict
In the course of presenting this history, the Court relates its own history in the voting
rights area. The Court, however, cites only those decisions in which it invalidates
efforts aimed at excluding blacks from the franchise. See id. at 311-12. It reduces to
invisibility decisions such as Giles or Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 55 (1935)
(insulating from constitutional attack a version of the white primary), overruled by
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), rulings in which the Court itself became
complicit in nullifying the Fifteenth Amendment. Perhaps the Court intended its
presentation of its history to further the struggle for racial justice by inventing a
tradition of unbroken judicial solicitude for the rights of African Americans at the
ballot box. Regardless of the motivation or strategy, scholars need to be aware that
they cannot depend upon the Court to describe thoroughly its own institutional
history. This is an important matter since teachers frequently use cases as historical
narratives. It may be that one reason Giles has dropped from the legal academic
canon is that it was dropped by the Justices from the Supreme Court's own canon.
52. Giles, 189 U.S. at 488.
53. Pildes, supra note 51.
54. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
55. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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has had more of an effect on broadly applicable law than any other
racial conflict. White-red racial conflict has also generated a
tremendous amount of law, much of which has been gathered together
and organized under the rubric of Federal Indian Law.' All three
branches of the federal government, however, have long treated the
Indian tribes as a sui generis group for whom unique laws are
appropriate. This sharply limits the applicability of decisions in that
area of the law and concomitantly limits interest in that area. If the
Fourteenth Amendment had been limited to the protection of blacks,
it would be of far less concern to far fewer people than it is today.
That Federal Indian law has been effectively segregated doctrinally in
courts and in law schools both reflects and explains, at least in part,
the isolation of Indian affairs from major currents of intellectual life in
legal academia, including courses and books on race relations law.
The splitting off of Federal Indian law from race relations law in
general is a development and practice that ought to be reconsidered
and undone. Considerable enlightenment about the (mis)-treatment
of Indians and other non-white peoples could be generated by
systematically exploring the differences in treatment accorded to
these various groups. For example, at the same time that federal and
state governments imposed racial separation on blacks, they imposed
racial assimilation on Indians. This is an important juxtaposition to
which more attention should be called. It suggests the variety with
which racial prejudice can express itself and suggests, too, the variety
of racial ideologies that vulnerable, racial minorities have had to
confront. At the same time that many influential decisionmakers
believed that Indians could be "saved" through a process of
assimilationist whitening, these same decisionmakers saw blacks as
irredeemably alien, incapable of assimilation, and thus fit only for a
social existence safely distant from white society.
Alexis de Toqueville's comparative focus on whites, blacks, and
Indians, what he called "the three races of America," enriched the
bright and harsh light that he shed on race relations law in Democracy
in America." Writing in the 1830s, De Tocqueville demonstrated an
admirable comprehensiveness in examining the inter-relationship of
those three races.5" Subsequently, however, many "races," including
"yellow" people from China, Japan, and other Asian countries and
"brown" people from Mexico, the Philippines, Hawaii, and other
56. The most significant scholarly engagement in this field remains Felix S.
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1942), a text that is canonical along
several dimensions.
57. See 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 337-42 (Henry Reeve
trans., Colonial Press rev. ed. 1900) (1835).
58. See Randall Kennedy, Tocqueville and Racial Conflict in America: A
Comment, 11 Harv. BlackLetter J. 145, 152 (1994).
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places that have been gripped by American imperialism have peopled
the United States.
States and the federal government in the United States have
subjected people of color to all manner of racial abuses that have
generated controversies that have spilled into legislatures and courts
and given rise to a large body of law that ought to be part of the canon
of race relations law. This is a relatively uncontroversial point; it is
hard to imagine any course substantially concerned with race relations
law that would fail to include for discussion Yick Wo v. Hopkins9 or
Korematsu v. United States.6 At the same time, there is discernible, in
legal academia and beyond, a growing impatience with analyses of
race relations law that marginalize the history, participation, and
concerns of people of color other than the white, black, and red.6'
This dissatisfaction is justified.62 The United States is not simply a tri-
racial society; it is a profoundly multi-racial society. Attending to that
fact poses yet more problems for teachers and writers who already
face daunting dilemmas of selectivity. That fact also indicates,
however, the extraordinary possibilities latent in the field of race
relations law-possibilities that await realization in the years ahead.
My sixth suggestion is that scholars of race relations law, and
scholars in general, ought to canonize materials and techniques that
clarify what actually happened as a consequence of a constitutional
amendment, statutory provision, or judicial or administrative ruling.
Too often, discussions of legal developments proceed on the
assumption that realities mirror formal changes in rules. To some
extent, reality does change whenever a lawmaking body renders a
decision. Even if onlookers ignore the decision, the ruling itself
changes the contours of law and thus effectuates a reform, albeit
limited, that is worthy of notice. To that extent, no decision is totally
hollow, and every decision is somewhat significant. Worthy of notice,
too, is the degree to which social practices change as a consequence of
judicial, legislative, or executive lawmaking. Too little study is
devoted to this inquiry. To be sure, some investigation of the actual
social consequences of lawmaking have been undertaken.63 Even
59. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
60. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
61. See generally, e.g., Symposium, Race and Remedy in a Multicultural Society, 47
Stan. L. Rev. 819 (1995) (especially Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment:
It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 957) (examining the
"emergence of a new form of racial tension" due to an increase in racial diversity);
LatCrit: Latinas/os and the Law: A Joint Symposium by California Law Review and
La Raza Law Journal, 10 La Raza L.J. 1 (1998), 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1087 (1997)
(encouraging "a LatCrit consciousness, community and literature within the
contemporary legal culture of the United States").
62. I have been insufficiently attentive to the full panoply of race matters in my
own work. See Viet D. Dinh, Races, Crime, and the Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1289,
1289-90 (1998) (reviewing Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law).
63. See, e.g., Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in
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when they exist, however, such studies receive too little attention in
the legal academic canon.
III.
I turn now to the question: With what political and pedagogical
attitude should a course on race relations be taught? I approach this
inquiry with some trepidation because my own attitude-or at least
my perceived attitude-has been harshly criticized. In The Strange
Career of Randall Kennedy, Professor Derrick Bell expresses regret
that I became his successor as the teacher of the basic course on race
relations law at Harvard Law School.' 4 He maintains that I started off
my teaching and scholarly career on the right track, stating that my
"first few articles were stunning models of racial advocacy," '' "hard-
hitting writing filled with bite and passion."6 They seemed to foretell,
he continued, that I "would become a powerful voice for a people
whose expectations that the civil rights era would gain its racial justice
goals were fading fast."'67 But then, in his view, I took a wrong turn. I
became "impartial" and all too ready to criticize publicly righteous
positions embraced by champions of civil rights.' According to Bell, I
seemed to have forgotten whose side I was on and comported myself
intellectually "in ways that-whether intended or not-serve to
America (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993) (publishing findings from
auditing studies of discrimination in housing, lending, employment, and other areas);
Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual
Constitutional Rights, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 7-14 (1984) (outlining the difficulties in
measuring the effects of a court's holdings on society); John J. Donahue III & Peter
Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan.
L. Rev. 983, 984 (1991) (citing "a need for reevaluating employment discrimination
policy"); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement,
80 Va. L. Rev. 7, 10 (1994) (arguing that social, political, and economic factors
contributed to a change in race relations); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1996) (arguing the
influence of various factors on the transformation of constitutional law); Kenneth J.
Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned about Batson and Peremptory
Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 484-502 (1996) (examining the many factors
utilized in peremptory challenges); Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky,
Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. Mich. J.L
Reform 229, 235-75 (1993) (analyzing cases dealing with preemptor)' challenges after
Batson and concluding that prosecutors actually preempt jurors based on race
although they provide another reason).
64. See Derrick Bell, The Strange Career of Randall Kennedy, New Politics,
Summer 1998, at 55.
65. Id- at 56. The articles to which he refers are Randall L Kennedy, McCleskey
v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L Rev. 1388
(1988); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comnent on tie Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327 (1986); Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law
and the Tradition of Celebration. The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 Colum. L Rev.
1622 (1986). See Bell, supra note 64, at 66-67.
66. Bell, supra note 64, at 66.
67. Id at 56.
68. Id
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comfort many whites and distress blacks."69 "Disgruntled students
complained," Bell reports, "that Kennedy spent more time
challenging and even denigrating civil rights positions than he did
analyzing the continuing practices and policies of discrimination that
made those policies, whatever their shortcomings, necessary."70
Bell's critique raises a variety of fundamental issues. First, by
charging that I have abandoned the "advocacy orientation" of the
course that he bequeathed to me, Bell implicitly asserts that a course
on race relations law-and perhaps all courses-should be taught with
an advocacy orientation. Unfortunately, Professor Bell neglects to
define clearly what he means by advocacy orientation. I believe that
what he means to refer to is an attitude of engagement in which the
teacher is seeking to change the world, at least a bit, by shaping the
perspectives of his or her students. An advocacy orientation is a
commitment to challenge unjust aspects of the status quo and
recommend needed reforms, no matter how radical. If this is what
Professor Bell means by an "advocacy orientation"-and I think it
is-then he and I agree on a fundamental point. Professors in every
law school class are constantly, indeed unavoidably, taking a position,
either implicitly or explicitly, with respect to the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the system of law they are attempting to analyze.
Professor Bell wants his colleagues to be conscious of the political
stances that they take in their books, articles, lectures, and other
pedagogical tasks, including letters of recommendation and votes for
tenure. I applaud his realistic appraisal of the unavoidably political
elements of pedagogy and his insistence on a high degree of
ideological self-awareness. Where, then, do we disagree in ways
relevant to constructing a course on race relations law? Conflicts arise
in a variety of areas, three of which are particularly important.
First, Bell is supremely confident that he knows what policy
positions are the correct civil rights positions to adopt and thus the
69. Id. at 57. To preclude charges that I have quoted Professor Bell "out of
context," I shall offer a full paragraph of his comments:
Kennedy, like Thurgood Marshall, is a contrarian. He loves to argue and
play the devil's advocate. This is a useful talent in the classroom and is quite
helpful in fine-tuning litigation strategies. Justice Marshall, though, never
forgot whose side he was on, particularly in public proclamations as opposed
to private discourse. In public, he was the ultimate advocate for the black
cause as reflected in his civil rights career and his judicial tenure. Kennedy,
on the other hand, is quite willing to take his differences with black people
public in ways that-whether intended or not-serve to comfort many
whites and distress blacks. It is not that his criticisms are new. White
conservatives have made similar arguments and worse. It is that he is
relinquishing a much needed advocacy role and taking positions that render
him an apologist [for aspects of a system] that are less overtly racist than in
earlier times but no less ominous in the threat they pose for all blacks.
Id. (footnote omitted).
70. Id. at 56.
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ones to urge his students to follow. Because Bell is so confident, he is
impatient with others who lack his certitude. He displays this
impatience by routinely portraying opponents as either racists or
opportunists. I lack his certitude and believe that there is good reason
to be open-minded about a variety of hotly-contested debates
regarding race relations policy. I therefore believe that a well-
constructed course on race relations law should provide room for a
patient, tolerant exploration of alternative resolutions to the dilemmas
we face.
It is ironic, in the extreme, for me to be advocating a patient,
tolerant exploration of alternative positions in race relations in
response to Professor Bell. After all, one of his signal contributions to
the legal academic literature is Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation," which sharply
questioned the propriety of civil rights attorneys pressing for one sort
of remedy in school desegregation cases while their putative clients
seemed to prefer a different sort of remedy. "The time has come,"
Professor Bell concluded, "for civil rights lawyers to end their single-
minded commitment to racial balance, a goal which, standing alone, is
increasingly inaccessible and all too often educationally impotent."'
Some circles considered Bell's article heretical. 3 Indeed, to some,
unfortunately, it was cause for political and intellectual
excommunication. Wherever one stands on the merits of the dispute,
however, the important point here is that Bell was a participant in a
bona fide dispute between bona fide champions of African American
advancement over the best strategy to pursue. Then, as well as now,
properly determining how best to proceed took more than an
emotional commitment to "doing the right thing." It also required an
intellectual investment to figure out what constituted doing the right
thing, a task that is even more complicated today than it was in 1973
when Professor Bell published the first edition of Race, Racism and
American Law, a wonderful compendium of source material for which
all scholars owe him a large intellectual debt.
A properly constructed course on race relations law at the dawn of
the twenty-first century should provide students with educational
materials and psychological space so that they can determine for
themselves appropriate responses to a host of vexing dilemmas. Some
champions of African American advancement, for example, maintain
that for purposes of fully enforcing anti-discrimination norms, black
workers within majority-white unions should be able to negotiate with
or challenge employers independently of their union bureaucracies.
Their fear, of course, is that the officials of such unions will be
71. 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976).
72 Id. at 516.
73. See Nathaniel R. Jones, Correspondence, School Desegregation, 86 Yale L.J.
378,381 (1976).
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insufficiently aggressive in protecting the interests of black workers.
Arguing in favor of this position, a dissenting judge declared in 1974
that
TO LEAVE NON-WHITES AT THE MERCY OF WHITES IN
THE PRESENTATION OF NON-WHITE CLAIMS WHICH
ARE ADMITTEDLY ADVERSE TO THE WHITES WOULD
BE A MOCKERY OF DEMOCRACY.... IN PRESENTING
NON-WHITE ISSUES NON-WHITES CANNOT, AGAINST
THEIR WILL, BE RELEGATED TO WHITE SPOKESMEN,
MIMICKING BLACK MEN. THE DAY OF THE MINSTREL
SHOW IS OVER. 74
When the ruling to which this judge dissented was appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), the single most
influential black defense organization in American history, backed his
stance. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this stance. More
significantly, for our purposes, the Justice who wrote the opinion for
the Court was none other than Justice Thurgood Marshall, "Mr. Civil
Rights." Disagreeing with the NAACP, Justice Marshall believed that
a correct reading of the applicable labor law required deference to
union control over the presentation of worker grievances-including
complaints by black workers of racial discrimination. He also
believed that black workers in unions would generally be better off by
playing within the established groundrules of the labor movement,
even if this meant subordinating their special grievances to the overall
goals of the unions representing them.75 That Marshall, America's
first black Supreme Court justice, wrote the Court's opinion does not
make that ruling right or even necessarily in the best interest of
blacks. It is safe to say, though, that Thurgood Marshall would not
favor the perpetuation of a minstrel show.
There are many other areas in which people who are thoroughly
committed to advancing the interests of blacks disagree over how best
to proceed. Some champions of African American uplift urge
rejection of the integrationist approach to racial equity in educational
opportunities that prevailed during much of the civil rights era of the
1950s and 1960s.76 Others, however, counsel embracing integrationist
74. Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 940 (1973)
(Wyzanski, J., dissenting).
75. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50, 67-70 (1975). This issue remains contentious. See Molly S. McUsic & Michael
Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the Workplace, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1339,
1353 (1997).
76. See Bell, supra note 51, at 574-605; Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court
Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 Cornell L. Rev.
1, 6 (1992); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why
Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1401, 1406-32 (1993).
Some of the sentiments that nourish this perspective have deep historical roots. See
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strategies.' Some champions of black advancement argue in favor of
seeking better housing and other opportunities by encouraging the
dispersal of black ghetto-dwellers." Others, by contrast, argue in
favor of consolidating the strength of black ghettoes and bringing
greater opportunities to inner-city blacks where they already reside.9
Debates rage over whether, for blacks, it is better to elect as many
black representatives as possible from majority-black voting districts
or to more fully spread the influence of black voters, even at the cost
of sacrificing dominance in a certain number of voting districts,"
whether it is better to invest more in securing public safety in high-
crime, majority-minority neighborhoods (even at the cost of
encroaching upon personal privacy), or to insist that residents of such
neighborhoods be accorded the same degree of privacy afforded to
residents of safer, whiter, more affluent neighborhoods." whether it is
better to prefer to place black orphaned children in black adoptive
families or to stipulate that such children will be placed in the first
adoptive home available, regardless of race;8 whether redistributive
W.E. Burghardt DuBois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. Negro Educ.
328, 329 (1935); Davison M. Douglas, The Limits of Law in Accomplishing Racial
Change: School Segregation in the Pre-Brown North, 44 UCLA L Rev. 677, 697
(1997).
77. See, e.g., Gary Orfield et al., Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal
of Brown v. Board of Education 345-46 (1996) (suggesting ways "to move toward
integration").
7& See, eg., Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal
Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. Pa. L Rev.
1285, 1328-41 (1995) (arguing that enforcing laws against discrimination in housing
could solve the problem of racial segregation).
79. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation:
"Hewing a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair", 143 U. Pa. L Rev. 1233,
1271-72 (1995) (arguing that a grassroots approach from within the community may
be a better way to improve the quality of life for people of color).
80. See David Lublin, The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering
and Minority Interests in Congress 87-97 (1997); Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of
Race, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1386-89 (1995) (reviewing Quiet Revolution in the
South (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)).
81. Consider the debate between Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan, both of whom
argue in favor of enhancing police authority for the benefit of crime-ravaged and
impoverished minority communities, and more traditional civil libertarians who see
enhanced police power as a likely menace to racial minorities. Compare Tracey L
Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Urgent Times: Policing and Rights in Inner-City
Communities 3-6 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999) (stating that many inner-
city residents support increased law enforcement measures to combat crime), with
David Cole, Foreword. Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to
the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 Geo. L.J. 1059, 1062-63 (1999) (arguing that
the negative effects of aggressive policing may outweigh the benefits gained by inner-
city communities), and Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the
Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. Crim. L & Criminology 775,
835-36 (1999) (arguing that vague loitering laws "reinforce[] stereotypes that portray
Blacks as lawless and legitimate police harassment in Black communities," thus
eroding "constitutional safeguards against race-based police abuse").
82. Some commentators fervently believe that it is in the best interest of orphaned
black children for the state to attempt to place them for adoption with black adults.
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reforms primarily animated by a desire to help blacks are best
packaged as race-specific or race-neutral.83 A course on race relations
law should make clear that enlightened, non-racist activists, jurists,
and commentators can be found on several sides of these
controversies. Contrary to Professor Bell's rhetoric, these issues are
not, forgive the expression, black and white. They are multi-
dimensional and should be portrayed, seen, and dealt with as such.
A second broad area of pedagogical conflict between Professor Bell
See James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus Between
Putative Afro-American Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26 J. Fam.
L. 487, 514-15 (1987); Cynthia G. Hawkins-Le6n, The Indian Child Welfare Act and
the African American Tribe: Facing the Adoption Crisis, 36 J. Fam. L. 201, 217-18
(1998); Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Transracial Adoption (TRA): Old Prejudices and
Discrimination Float Under a New Halo, 6 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 409, 417-18 (1997).
Other commentators fervently believe that it is a terrible disservice to black orphans
for the state to attempt to place them for adoption with black adults, given the delays
and other problems that such efforts cause. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds:
Adoption and the Politics of Parenting 92-93 (1993); Elizabeth Bartholet, Nobody's
Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift, and the Adoption Alternative 135-40
(1999); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best
Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 925, 966-67 (1994); Randall
Kennedy, Orphans of Separatism: The Painfid Politics of Transracial Adoption, Am.
Prospect, Spring 1994, at 38,38-42.
83. Among those on the leftwards side of the political spectrum support for race-
specific reforms is broad and intense. See, e.g., Christopher Edley, Jr., Not All Black
and White: Affirmative Action, Race, and American Values 278 (1996) (supporting,
maintaining, and reforming a national affirmative action policy); Charles R. Lawrence
III & Mari J. Matsuda, We Won't Go Back: Making the Case for Affirmative Action
1 (1997) (defending affirmative action as an affirmation of democratic values); Paul
Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 841, 843-44
(1997) (arguing for race-based affirmative action in criminal law); A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating
Racial Consequences, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1593, 1644 (1994) (arguing that the
Supreme Court's rejection of majority-minority districts is fundamentally flawed);
Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 Duke L.J. 705, 705 (arguing that "large scale affirmative action would
improve the quality and increase the value of legal scholarship"). There are
progressives, however, who have expressed doubts about whether race-specific
policies will broadly advance the interests of most African Americans. See, e.g.,
Randall Kennedy, supra note *, at 29-135; William Julius Wilson, The Truly
Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The Underclass, and Public Policy 115 (1987) (stating
that race- or ethnicity-based affirmative action would "enhance the opportunities of
the more advantaged without addressing the problems of the truly disadvantaged").
On the rightwards end of the political spectrum there exists substantial literature
that argues that race-specific social policies, albeit well-intentioned, negatively affect
their presumed beneficiaries. See, e.g., Shelby Steele, The Content of Our Character:
A New Vision of Race in America 113 (1990) ("I think affirmative action has shown
itself to be more bad than good and that blacks.., now stand to lose more from it
than they gain."); Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: "In order to Get Beyond
Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race," 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 147, 156 (opposing
"racial affirmative action for reasons of both principal and practicality"); Glenn C.
Loury, Beyond Civil Rights, The New Republic, Oct. 7, 1985, at 22, 22 (arguing that
the broad application of the civil rights strategies to cases of "differential achievement
between blacks and whites threatens to make it impossible for blacks to achieve full
equality").
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and me arises from differing premises concerning the normative aims
of a course on race relations law. He seems to assume that its aim
should be to advance the interests of black people. As I indicated
above, what actually constitutes the best interests of black people is
more contested and more difficult to discern than Bell's rhetoric
suggests. But even if a broad consensus among African Americans
was reached over what constituted the best interest of black people,
major difficulties would still loom over an approach, like Bell's, which
measures the political virtue of any given policy in terms of "Is it good
for the blacks?" Blacks, after all, constitute only one portion of the
American polity. What is good for that portion will likely often be
good for the whole or good for social justice in general, but that need
not always be the case. The interests of blacks might come into
conflict with the interests of other groups whose claims in a given
situation are more pressing or weighty than those of blacks. When
that happens, I see no reason to prefer the position of blacks, just as I
see no reason to prefer necessarily the position of whites, Jews,
Catholics, or any other particular social group.' A good course on
race relations law in the United States would show that any group,
like any person, is capable of perpetrating racial harms upon others.
It would show how people of Chinese ancestry have attempted to
deflect anti-Asian animus by scapegoating Indians and blacks-,"5 how
some Indians enslaved African Americans even as they themselves
were being cruelly ousted from their lands by Euro-Americans, 6 how
people of African ancestry have attempted to escape anti-Black
84. See Randall Kennedy, My Race Problem-And Ours, Atlantic Monthly, May
1997, at 55, 64-65.
85. In People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404-05 (1854), the California Supreme Court
ruled that state law excluded Chinese, along with blacks and Indians, from testifying
against whites. In the course of its decision the Court described Chinese as -[a
people] whose mendacity is proverbial; a race... nature has marked as inferior, and
who are incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain point."
Id. at 405. A prominent Chinese merchant responded in the following terms: "[The
whites] have come to the conclusion that we Chinese are the same as Indians and
Negroes .... And yet these Indians know nothing about the relations of society; they
know no mutual respect; they wear neither clothes nor shoes; they live in wild places
and [in] caves." Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in
Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 Cal. L Rev. 529, 550
(1984) (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted). The Chinese merchant
argued, in other words, that it was understandable to exclude Indians and blacks from
the witness stand but an injustice to do the same to people of Chinese ancestry.
86. See Annie Heloise Abel, The American Indian as Slaveholder and
Secessionist 1-5 (University Neb. Press 1992) (1915); Theda Perdue, Slavery and the
Evolution of Cherokee Society, 1540-1866, at 38-39, 66 (1979); Kathryn E. Holland
Braund, The Creek Indians, Blacks, and Slavery, 57 J. S. Hist. 601. 601-02, 616-18.
(1991); C. Calvin Smith, The Oppressed Oppressors: Negro Slavery Among the
Choctaw Indians of Oklahoma, 2 Red River Valley Hist. Rev. 240, 24041 (1975);
William S. Willis, Divide and Rule: Red, White, and Black in the Southeast, 48 J. Negro
Hist. 157, 168-73 (1963).
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animus by scapegoating Indians;' how Jews have attempted to escape
anti-Semitism by scapegoating Negroes;m how some African
Americans have racially-targeted Korean Americans; 9 and how, of
course, whites of various ethnicities have attempted systematically to
subordinate blacks and other people's of color.
Professor Bell is really interested only in the last of these topics.
For example, when one looks up the key term "racism" in the third
edition of Race, Racism and American Law, one finds the following
entry: "Racism-See White racism."90 This elliptical comment stems
from a theory that has, unfortunately, been gaining influence steadily
over the past thirty years. Under that theory, blacks and other racially
oppressed peoples cannot be "racist" because "racism" can only be
manifested by groups with power. According to this theory, "racism"
equals prejudice plus power. According to proponents of this theory,
blacks can be prejudiced, but blacks cannot be racists because they
lack the power to effectuate the prejudices they may harbor.
87. In 1914, a group of African Americans rightly objected to an Oklahoma
statute that authorized railroads to provide first class service only to whites. They
prevailed in the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that the statute in
question violated the formal equality under which de jure segregation was justified.
See McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914).
Unfortunately, in the course of pleading their case, they participated in the unjustified
vilification of other oppressed people. Complaining that Indians were protected from
exclusion while blacks were not, the plaintiffs objected that Indians are "far more
vicious as well as unclean and unhealthy ...." Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 43, at
778 n.146 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 50-51, McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914)).
88. In an effort to defend Leo Frank against rape charges, see supra note 44 and
accompanying text, supporters pointed to a black man who should have been a prime
suspect. They attempted to foment anger against him by resorting to racist, anti-black
stereotypes that depict black men as rapacious sexual beasts. A sign of the
extraordinary character of the animus against Frank is that the Negro-baiting tactics
of his defenders failed. They "expressed outrage that a white employer was indicted,
rather than a black worker with a criminal record, and shock that their appeals to
white supremacy failed to rally the jury or the public." Nancy MacLean, The Leo
Frank Case Reconsidered: Gender and Sexual Politics in the Making of Reactionary
Populism, 78 J. Am. Hist. 917, 925 (1991). Many blacks reacted angrily to this
attempt to supercede anti-Jewish prejudice with anti-black bigotry. See Eugene Levy,
"Is the Jew a White Man?": Press Reaction to the Leo Frank Case, 1913-1915, 35
Phylon 212, 215-18 (1974).
89. See Kwang Chung Kim & Shin Kim, The Multiracial Nature of Los Angeles
Unrest in 1992, in Koreans in the Hood: Conflict with African Americans 17, 34
(Kwang Chung Kim ed., 1999) [hereinafter Koreans in the Hood]; Heon Cheol Lee.
Conflict Between Korean Merchants and Black Customers: A Structural Analysis, in
Koreans in the Hood, supra, at 113, 114; Pyong Gap Min & Andrew Kolodny, The
Middleman Minority Characteristics of Korean Immigrants in the United States, in
Koreans in the Hood, supra, at 131, 144-49.
90. Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 683 (3d ed. 1992). It should be
noted that in the fourth edition of Race, Racism and American Law, Professor Bell
changes "White racism" to "American racism." Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and
American Law 1029 (4th ed. 2000). All things considered, however, one doubts that
this emendation signals a significant transformation in his outlook.
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Materials that should be part of a good course on race relations law-
sociological materials on the racial demographics of authority within
the society-would enable a student to see the speciousness of this
theory. They would enable a student to demystify the myth of black
powerlessness. For the fact is that in an appreciable number of
significant locales and institutions, blacks do occupy positions of
authority from which they could, if they so chose, use their power to
effectuate prejudices. Scores of cities, police departments, military
units, prisons, personnel offices, and social service agencies are
directed by black officials who, like their white counterparts, make
numerous low-visibility, discretionary choices that are routinely
granted tremendous deference both within and without the
bureaucracies in which they function.
Furthermore, under certain circumstances, even weak individuals or
groups can exercise power over others who, in the normal course of
things, occupy a higher social status. I think here of the lowly rapist or
a group of historically-victimized rapists. I think of what happened to
a thirty-year old woman whose assailant, before raping her, told her
that before she died he would make sure that she knew what it felt
like to "have a nigger cock."91 I think, too, of what happened to
Kristin Huggins, the victim of a rape-murder in 1992 at the hands of
Ambrose A. Harris. Harris and an associate agreed to perpetrate a
car-jacking so that they would have an automobile with which to
commit a robbery they were planning. Offering clarification as to
what would be done with inconvenient prisoners, Harris reportedly
said that he would "'tie them up and leave them somewhere' if they
were black.... [but] would kill them if they were white."' - When
Huggins unluckily drove her car near Harris, he is said to have
muttered "I'm going to get that bitch." 93 Finally, I think of a tragedy
that occurred in 1992, near Charleston, South Carolina. Four black
men abducted a white woman, Melissa McLauchlin, raped her, and
then killed her. Seeking to explain their actions, one of the
perpetrators stated that it constituted retaliation for "four hundred
years of oppression." '
Beyond the empirical fact that blacks can and do exercise
appreciable amounts of power in America, even while they remain
subjected to invidious and intolerable racial subordination, is the
additional fact that circumstances sometimes change with
breathtaking rapidity, empowering those who have been oppressed
and lowering those who have been ascendant. It is important, then, to
91. Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 367 S.E.2d 176, 178 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
92. State v. Harris, 716 A.2d 458,465 (NJ. 1998) (footnote omitted).
93. Id-
94. Chris Sosnovski, Death Penalty to be Sought for Gardner, Post & Courier,
Apr. 14, 1995, at A21; see also Richard Green, Jr., Trials Are Judge's Swan Song, Post
& Courier, Mar. 2,1998, at Al (summarizing the crime).
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be attentive to the moral hygiene of the weak. World history shows
quite vividly that persons and groups who have been dealt with
unjustly-I think, for example, of certain Serbs and Jews-are quite
capable of donning cloaks of victimhood and visiting terrible injustices
on others.
Given these considerations, teachers of courses on race relations
law in the United States should definitely be self-conscious as they
proceed to advocate favored policies; otherwise they will simply
proceed to be unselfconscious advocates. In advocating one policy,
doctrine, or outcome over others, however, a teacher's conclusion
should rest on a firmer foundation than that it advances the fortunes
of the race with which the teacher happens to identify. Thus, knowing
the racial demographics of who a given policy helped or hurt, or who
now supports or opposes a given reform, is an insufficient basis for
judging its propriety. An appropriate basis is whether the policy,
doctrine, or outcome satisfies a conception of justice that is broader,
grander, and more attractive than the simple preferences, racial
identity, or naked subjectivity of the teacher in charge.
Professors should also keep in mind that even amongst those united
in their desire to achieve "racial justice," the way towards that goal is
not at all clear. People differ over what they mean by racial justice.
Some mean preventing all forms of private or public racial
discrimination. Some mean preventing all forms of invidious racial
discrimination. Some mean preventing all forms of invidious racial
discrimination and redressing the discernible vestiges of racial wrongs
done in the past. On the other hand, some mean merely prohibiting
governments from engaging in invidious racial discrimination, while
expressly permitting private parties to do so. Furthermore, even
people who embrace one of these competing visions of racial justice
differ over which strategies to pursue to reach their agreed ends.
Against this backdrop of complexity, flux, and contestation, teachers
ought to inculcate within students a willingness to experiment, an
appreciation for empirical research that might shed light on the actual
consequences of various policies, and a tolerance for listening closely
to competing views.
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